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INTRODUCTION 
In their opening brief, defendants-appellants identified 
five major (and several subsidiary) points of errors made by the 
Utah Court of Appeals in the instant appeal.1 Mayor West's 
responsive brief is nothing more than (a) a recantation of his 
arguments to the trial court and/or the Court of Appeals and (b) a 
regurgitation of the Court of Appeals' analysis. As explained 
below, the attempt is unpersuasive and fails to either support or 
supplant the erroneous analyses of the Court of Appeals. 
ARGUMENT 
I . MAYOR WESTfS "PUBLIC VS. PRIVATE" DISTINCTION 
REGARDING HIS POSITION ON MUNICIPAL POWER IS 
MISPLACED AND CONTRARY TO THE PRINCIPLES OF 
MILKOVICH v . LORAIN JOURNAL CO. 
In t h e i r opening br ief , the newspaper defendants argued tha t 
the statements tha t the Mayor (a) changed h is pos i t ion on municipal 
power and (b) "attempts to manipulate the press" are 
cons t i t u t i ona l l y protected expressions of opinion under the 
p r inc ip le s of Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co.. 497 U.S. 1, 110 S. 
Ct. 2695 (1990) because they do not contain "provably fa lse factual 
connotat ions." Brief of Appellants a t 17-24. With respect to the 
municipal power statements, Mayor West responds tha t i t i s h i s 
"public" not h is "private" pos i t ion on municipal power which i s a t 
i s sue . Brief of Appellee a t 6-10. 
1
 A graphic summary of the t r i a l cour t ' s rul ings and the Court of 
Appeals' holdings i s attached hereto as Exhibit A for the convenience of the 
court . The Mayor makes no attempt to rebut defendants' argument that the 
"manipulate the press" statement i s protected opinion and therefore, presumably 
concedes t h i s argument. Brief of Appellee at 6-10. 
1 
Mayor West's emphasis on the "publ ic /pr iva te" dichotomy simply 
r e s t a t e s the Court of Appeals7 holding without any r ebu t t a l to 
defendants ' ana lys is of Milkovich. Brief of Appellee a t 6-10; West 
v, Thomson Newspapers. 835 P.2d 179, 183-87 (Utah Ct.. App. 1992) . 
I ron i ca l l y , West argues tha t he need only prove his "public" 
pos i t ion on municipal power, although he seeks to recover damages 
based upon the al leged implicat ion concerning h i s "pr ivate" in ten t 
to deceive the voters of LaVerkin.2 Brief of Appellee a t 6-10. 
Mayor West argues tha t the al leged connotation i s not opinion 
because h i s " l e t t e r s to c i t i z e n s " are object ive proof tha t he did 
not intend to deceive the v o t e r s . Brief of Appellee a t 8-10. This 
argument mistakes h i s burden. 
The "core of object ive evidence" required by Milkovich to 
independently prove a defamatory connotation must go d i r e c t l y to 
the asser ted connotation, not to the underlying factual a s se r t ion 
from which the implicat ion a r i s e s . In Milkovich v. Lorain Journal 
Co. , the Court expounded on the burden of demonstrating tha t a 
statement contains a "provably fa lse factual connotat ion." The 
Court s t a t ed : 
We note tha t the issue of f a l s i t y r e l a t e s to 
the defamatory fac ts implied by a s tatement. 
For ins tance , the statement, "I think Jones 
l i e d , " may be provable as fa l se on two l e v e l s . 
2
 The Court of Appeals miscast the a l l eged impl icat ion arid the as ser t ion 
at i s s u e . The court described the implied factual a s ser t ion as West's opposit ion 
to municipal power before the e l e c t i o n , and the a s ser t ion as h i s opposit ion to 
municipal power prior to the e l e c t i o n in order to get e l e c t e d . West, 835 P.2d 
at 186. This character izat ion of the subject statements i s simply erroneous. 
Exhibits D and G, Brief of Appellants , June 27, 1988 Op-ed Column, July 2, 1988 
Op-ed Column. Nothing in the a r t i c l e i t s e l f d i r e c t l y a s s e r t s that West opposed 
municipal power in order to get e l e c t e d . June Column. Rather, t h i s impl icat ion 
i s West's creat ion . 
2 
First, that the speaker really did not think 
that Jones had lied but said it anyway, and 
second that Jones really had not lied. It is, 
of course, the second level of falsity which 
would ordinarily serve as the basis for a 
defamation action . . . . 
Milkovich, 110 S. Ct. at 2706, n.7 (emphasis added). See also. Id. 
110 S. Ct. at 2710 n.4. (Brennen dissenting). Noting that the 
Philadelphia Newspapers v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767 (1986) requirement 
that plaintiff prove a statement false requires the court to first 
determine what statement was actually made, Justice Brennen 
explained further: 
The proof that Hepps requires from the 
plaintiff hinges on what the statement can 
reasonably be interpreted to mean. For 
instance, if Riley tells his friends that 
Smith cheats at cards and Smith then proves 
that he did not rob a convenience store, Smith 
cannot recover damages for libel on that basis 
because he has proved the wrong assertion 
false. Likewise, in the example in the text 
[of the majority opinion] , Jones cannot 
recover for defamation for the statement "I 
think Jones lied about his age just now" by 
producing proof that he did not lie about his 
age because, like Smith, he would have proved 
the wrong assertion false. The assertion 
Jones must prove false is that the speaker 
had, in fact, drawn the inference that Jones 
had lied. 
Id. at 2710, n.4. (emphasis added).3 In the instant case, Mayor 
West seeks to prove the wrong assertion false. Just as "Smith" 
cannot prevail by proving that "he did not lie, " West may not 
prevail by proving his public position on municipal power. He 
3
 While Justice Brennan dissented from the results in Milkovich, he 
concurred in the majority opinion's holding that the first Amendment protects 
opinions which, the court held, by definition, do not contain a provably false 
factual connotation. Id. at 2706-08. 
3 
seeks to recover for the alleged connotation that he sought to 
deceive LaVerkin's voters. Thus, he must prove that connotation 
false and do so by independent, objective evidence. Because this 
connotation is not capable of such proof, the municipal power 
statements are protected opinion. 
This rule is grounded in part upon the principles announced in 
New York Times v. Sullivan. 376 U.S. 254, 279 (1964), which are 
designed to provide broad protection for speech which is critical 
of, or speculates on, the motives of public officials. There, the 
Court stated: 
[P]olitical conduct and views which some 
respectable people approve, and others condemn 
are constantly imputed to Congressmen. Errors 
of fact, particularly in regard to a man's 
mental states and processes, are inevitable. 
New York Times Co. . 376 U.S. at 272 (quoting. Sweeney v. Patterson. 
128 F.2d 457, 458 (D.C. Ct. App. 1942) cert, denied. 317 U.S. 678 
(1942)) . In the political arena, "[c]harges of gross incompetence, 
disregard of the public interest, communist sympathies, and the 
like usually have filled the air . . . " Noel, Defamation of Public 
Officers and Candidates. 49 Col. L. Rev. 875 (1949). As Cordozo 
noted, "the timorous must stay home." Murphy v. Steeplechase 
Amusement Co., 166 N.E. 173, 174 (1929). Even Mayor West concedes 
that "attack [s] " in the press "come[] with the job of being mayor." 
Exhibit F, Brief of Appellant, Mayor's Letter to the Editor. It is 
thus clear that one of the prerogatives of American citizenship is 
the right to criticize public men and women and measures. Hustler 
Magazine v. Falwell. 485 U.S. 46, 49 (1985) . As a result, 
4 
"vehement, caus t ic and sometimes unpleasantly sharp a t tacks" on 
public o f f i c i a l s are expected because a "rule compelling the c r i t i c 
of o f f i c i a l conduct to guarantee the t r u th of a l l h i s factual 
a s se r t ions -- and to do so on pain of l i b e l judgments v i r t u a l l y 
unlimited in amount -- leads to . . . ' s e l f censorsh ip ' . . . ." 
New York Times Co.. 376 U.S. a t 270, 279. One court observed: 
[R]equiring a publ isher to guarantee the t r u th 
of a l l the inferences a reader might 
reasonably draw from a publ ica t ion would 
undermine the uninhibi ted, open discussion of 
matters of public concern. A publ isher 
repor t ing on matters of general public 
i n t e r e s t cannot be charged with the 
in to l e rab le burden of guessing what inferences 
a jury might draw from an a r t i c l e and ru l ing 
out a l l poss ible fa lse and defamatory 
innuendos tha t could be drawn from the 
a r t i c l e . 
Woods v. Evansville Press Co., 791 F.2d 480,487-88 (7th Cir. 
1986).4 For these reasons,5 Milkovich and Hepps mandate tha t a 
"core of object ive evidence" ex i s t upon which to prove tha t an 
al leged defamatory connotation i s f a l s e . 
4
 See a l s o . Gross v. New York Times Co., 587 N.Y.S.2d 293, 296 (N.Y. 
App. Div. 1992) app. dismissed 591 N.Y.S.2d 139 (N.Y. 1992) quoting, Immuno A.G. 
v. Moore-Jankowski, 74 N.Y.2d 548, 560 ("Immuno I") , vacated, U.S. , on 
remand, 77 N.Y.2d 235 ["Immuno II"] , cert denied, U.S. , 111 S. Ct. 2261 
(1991) . ("[S]peculations as to the motivations and potent ia l future consequences 
of proposed conduct general ly are not readi ly v e r i f i a b l e , and are therefore 
i n t r i n s i c l y unsuited as a foundation for l i b e l . " ) Gregory v. McDonnell Douglas 
Corp., 552 P.2d 425, 429-30 (Cal. 1976) (speculation concerning the motives of 
union leaders i s protected opinion where speculat ion re la ted to t h e i r f i t n e s s for 
o f f i c e ) . 
5
 The need to prove the f a l s i t y of the connotation i t s e l f i s further 
demonstrated by the fact that a public o f f i c i a l may change h i s or her mind on a 
matter of publ ic concern for a multitude of reasons other than an intent to 
deceive vo ter s . These include, among other reasons, (a) the o f f i c i a l discovered 
that the f a c t s upon which h i s or her p o s i t i o n were based were inaccurate; (b) a 
change of circumstances mandated a s h i f t in the o f f i c i a l ' s p o s i t i o n ; and (c) the 
o f f i c i a l merely recognized the merit of the superior reasoning of the opposing 
view. 
5 
Plaintiff's "private" intent to deceive the voters is not 
capable of such independent, objective proof. As the trial court 
correctly concluded, "the statements regarding the mayor's opinion 
on the position of municipal power do not contain a provable false 
factual connotation. . . . " (R.421). One who publicly expresses 
conclusions drawn from his observations of a public official's 
activities should not be placed in jeopardy of legal action for 
doing so because, "the positions and attitudes of public officials 
on matters affecting those whom they govern are always subject to 
analysis by the press and by the electorate." (R.357). If 
"voicing an opinion [is subject to] the peril of being contradicted 
by the public figure whose opinion is in debate and being subject 
to a lawsuit, it is clear that no prudent person wo\ild voice any 
opinion" because the criticized public official need only deny the 
criticism to set up a winnable lawsuit since his proof would be the 
only proof available (R.421). Consequently, the trial court ruled 
that the statements are "entitled to full constitutional 
protection." (R.422). The Court of Appeals' decision results from 
a faulty application of the Milkovich principles and must be 
reversed. 
II. MAYOR WEST'S ARGUMENTS NOTWITHSTANDING, THERE 
REMAINS A COMPELLING NEED TO RECOGNIZE INDEPENDENT 
PROTECTION FOR PUBLISHED OPINIONS UNDER ARTICLE I, 
SECTION 15 OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION. 
Mayor West makes two arguments in response to the call by 
defendants and the Society of Professional Journalists ("SPJ") for 
this Court to recognize independent protection for opinions under 
the Utah Constitution. Brief of Appellee at 10-13. He asserts 
6 
(a) that Guldan's description of the June Column as "present[ing] 
the facts" in an "unopinionated format" precludes defendants' 
defense that any inferences from the municipal power statements 
constitute protected opinion, and (b) that this Court should not 
recognize independent protections for opinions because Utah should 
not otherwise protect false defamatory statements published with 
actual malice. As set forth below, these arguments do not 
withstand careful scrutiny. 
K. Guldan*s Post-Hoc Description Of The June 
Column Does Not Transform The Opinions In 
That Column To Statements Of Fact. 
Referring to the June Column, Guldan stated: 
I addressed areas of concern I had about the 
Mayor's actions. I believe I addressed them 
in a singularly unopinionated format. All I 
have done is presented the facts which were 
available to me, and left any conclusions to 
the reader. 
Exhibit G, Brief of Appellants, July 2, 1988 Op-Ed Column ("July 
Column") . This statement, made after the June Column was 
published, has no legal affect on the nature of the municipal power 
statement in that column. In Milkovich. the United States Supreme 
Court held that a party may not transform a defamatory assertion of 
fact into protected opinion merely by couching the assertion in 
terms of his or her "opinion." Milkovich. 110 S. Ct. at 2705. 
Using the court's example: the statement "John is a liar" does not 
become opinion by changing it to: "In my opinion, John is a liar." 
Conversely, Reporter Guldan cannot unwittingly transform 
nondefamatory opinions [which the Mayor asserts are implicit in the 
7 
municipal power statements] into fact by post-hoc describing such 
"opinions" as "facts." 
In addition, Guldan's statement should not be so construed 
because it was merely a general reference to a series of indepen-
dent and separate assertions concerning Mayor West's actions. The 
statement was not a specific reference to the actions of Mayor West 
regarding municipal power. In his June Column, Rick Guldan 
criticized Mayor West for his conduct on a variety of subjects, 
including (a) imploring LaVerkin citizens to bring business to the 
city to improve its tax base while locating his own business in 
another community; (b) retaining a Wyoming driver's license to 
preserve his hunting privileges there and refusing to obtain a Utah 
driver's license; (c) avoiding taxes on license plates by utilizing 
dealer plates from his car dealership; and (d) changing his 
position on municipal power. Exhibit D, Brief of Appellants, June 
27, 1988 Column (the "June Column"). The Mayor did not deny many 
of these assertions. Exhibit F, Brief of Appellant, Mayor's Letter 
to Editor ("Letter to Editor"). 
Indeed, Guldan's statement that he just related the facts was 
a loose, general statement in response to the Mayor's complaint 
that Reporter Guldan was attacking him with "inaccuracies" and 
"half-truths." West Letter to the Editor. In addition, Guldan's 
comment was made in a newspaper opinion column, not in a legal 
brief intended to express a precise legal concept under the law of 
defamation. Therefore, Guldan's statement has no preclusive effect 
on this Court's decision as to whether it should recognize greater 
8 
pro tec t ion for expressions of opinion under the Utah Const i tut ion 
than are current ly accorded by the F i r s t Amendment. 
B. West's Argument Improperly Combines the 
Separate Concepts of Actual Malice and Opinion 
and Fails to Recognize the Practical 
Uncertainties Created by the Milkovich 
Opinion. 
Mayor West next argues tha t Utah's cons t i tu t ion should not 
recognize independent pro tec t ions for opinions because the law 
should not pro tec t defamatory statements published with actual 
malice. Brief of Appellee a t 12-13. This argument i s flawed for 
two reasons. F i r s t , whether a statement i s or i s not an expression 
of opinion i s determined without any inquiry in to the issue of 
ac tual malice. The two concepts -- opinion and actual malice --
are wholly unre la ted . If a statement i s an expression of opinion, 
the issue of ac tual malice i s never reached. Second, West's 
argument ignores the p r a c t i c a l d i f f i c u l t i e s the press have in 
accurate ly discr iminat ing between opinions, which carry no provable 
factual connotation, and asse r t ions of fac t , which do. Unfortu-
nate ly , vast d i spa r i t y wi l l always separate individual views as to 
whether any given asse r t ion contains a "provably fa lse factual 
connotation."6 
6
 For example, in Milkovich, the ent i re court agreed with the rule 
announced by the majority opinion, yet Jus t i ce s Brennan and Marshall strongly 
disagreed with the Court's appl icat ion of the rule to the s p e c i f i c f a c t s in that 
case . Compare. Milkovich, 110 S. Ct. at 2707-08 (reasonable fac t f inder could 
conclude that the subject statements implied an as ser t ion that the p l a i n t i f f 
perjured himself at a j u d i c i a l proceeding) (majority opinion) with, Milkovich, 
110 S. Ct. at 2710-15 (the statements at i s sue cannot reasonably be interpreted 
as applying a connotation that Milkovich l i e d ) . (Brennan, d i s s e n t i n g ) . 
In Philadelphia Newspapers v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767 (1986) the United States 
Supreme Court recognized a s imi lar problem concerning whether a p l a i n t i f f or 
media defendant should bear the burden of proof on the i s sue of f a l s i t y . The 
court noted, " [t]here w i l l always be instances when the fact f inding process w i l l 
9 
Milkovich provides no guidelines to assist the media in 
discriminating between opinion and fact in order to avoid chilling 
robust and open debate on issues of public concern. Milkovich 
requires editorial staffs to predict at their peril aill potential 
defamatory connotations lurking behind the words they print. 
Ultimately, the media will be forced to either bear the expense of 
libel suits accompanying criticism of political officials or censor 
criticism because of the remote possibility of hidden defamatory 
connotations. Principles of free speech in the U.S. and Utah 
Constitutions demand that the scales tip to favor free speech in 
order to provide the "breathing space" necessary to foster 
"uninhibited" and "robust" debate on public issues when such 
uncertainty exists. The Court in Immuno AG. v. Moor-Jankowski. 
noted: 
Milkovich may leave an area of uncer ta in ty for 
future l i t i g a t i o n , with courts and authors in 
the inter im lacking c lear guidance regarding 
the opinion p r i v i l e g e . . . . If we again 
assume the i d e n t i t y of S ta te and Federal law, 
and assume tha t Milkovich has effected no 
change in the law, we perpetuate tha t 
uncer ta in ty in our Sta te law. Moreover, we 
are concerned tha t - - if indeed ' type of 
speech' i s to be construed narrowly 
' i n s u f f i c i e n t p ro tec t ion may be accorded to 
cen t ra l values protected by the laws of t h i s 
S t a t e . 
Immuno AG. v. Moor-Jankowski. 567 N.E.2d 1270, 1278 (N.Y. 1991). 
be unable to resolve conc lus ive ly whether the speech i s true or f a l s e . . . ." 
Id. at 776. Therefore, the party which bears the burden of proof on f a l s i t y w i l l 
in some instances l o se despi te the fact that t h e i r p o s i t i o n i s , in an abstract 
sense, meritorious . Id. The court held that p l a i n t i f f must then bear the burden 
because, "where the s c a l e s are in such an uncertain balance, we be l i eve that the 
Const i tut ion requires us to t i p them in favor of protect ing true speech." Id. 
at 776. 
10 
Contrary to the Mayor's argument, the actual malice standard 
provides no solace to editorial staffs in these circumstances. 
The "totality of the circumstances" analysis advanced by the 
SPJ and urged by the defendants will provide the necessary 
breathing space to avoid media self-censorship of criticism of 
public officials. See Brief of Amicus Curiae at 30-35. For these 
reasons, this Court should adopt that analysis for evaluating 
whether statements represent protected opinions or actionable 
assertions of fact under Article I, Section 15 of the Utah 
Constitution. This is the only means available to provide 
breathing space necessary to ensure robust debate on political 
issues throughout the State. 
III. CONTRARY TO MAYOR WEST'S POSITION, ANDERSON v. 
LIBERTY LOBBY DOES NOT REQUIRE THAT PUBLISHER 
HOGUN AND EDITOR GOODEY "FORECLOSE THE 
POSSIBILITY" THAT A JURY "MIGHT" FIND THEY 
PUBLISHED THE MUNICIPAL POWER STATEMENTS WITH 
ACTUAL MALICE. 
In their opening brief, defendants demonstrated that free 
speech principles embodied in the First Amendment as well as Rule 
56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure mandated that the trial 
court apply a "heightened scrutiny" standard of review when it 
considered defendants' motion for summary judgment. Brief of 
Appellants at 29-34. Mayor West fails to even counter Appellant's 
constitutional analysis. Brief of Appellee at 13-16. Rather, he 
simply parrots the Court of Appeals' holding that summary judgment 
was inappropriate under Rule 56 because defendants did not 
"foreclose" the "possibility" that a jury "might" rule in West's 
favor. Brief of Appellee at 13-16; West, 835 P.2d at 188-89. 
11 
The Court of Appeals and Mayor West erred because they 
misunderstood the holdings in Anderson v. Liberty Lobby. 477 U.S. 
242 (1986) and Celotex Corp. v. Ca t r e t t . 477 U.S. 317 (1986) which 
explain the respect ive burdens borne by the movant and nonmovant on 
a summary judgment motion.7 Discussing the movant's burden, the 
Celotex court held tha t the movant must "show" or "point out" to 
the Court the absence of a genuine issue of mater ia l f ac t . Jd . a t 
323-25. To meet t h i s burden, the movant may present aff i rmative 
evidence negating the nonmovant's claims or simply point out the 
absence of evident iary support for those claims. Id . When the 
movant has met t h i s requirement, the burden then s h i f t s to the 
nonmovant to demonstrate a genuine dispute regarding a mater ia l 
f ac t . Id. a t 324.8 See a l so . Lind v. Lynch. 665 P.2d 1276, 1279 
(Utah 1983) (if defendant had presented some evident iary mater ia l 
refut ing any malice on h is pa r t , and had the p l a i n t i f f s f a i l ed to 
respond to i t , the t r i a l court could have ruled tha t there was no 
genuine issue with respect to mal ice) . Nothing in Celotex 
ind ica tes tha t the par ty moving for summary judgment must 
7
 The Court of Appeals also adopted the flawed reasoning of Jus t ice 
Brennen's dissent in Anderson that the majority opinion in that case 
simultaneously prohib i t s and requires courts to "weigh the evidence." West, 835 
P.2d a t 189, n . l l , Anderson, 477 U.S. a t 265-67. Evaluation of the majority 
opinion reveals that the decision contains no such in terna l inconsistency. The 
court prohib i t s t r i a l courts from making c r e d ib i l i t y determinations or resolving 
issues in dispute on summary judgment. Anderson, 477 U.S. a t 249, 255. The 
court does require t r i a l courts to evaluate the evidence to determine that i t i s 
of suff ic ient quanti ty and qual i ty to meet the nonmovant's burden a t t r i a l . Id. 
a t 251-52, 254. 
8
 Defendants acknowledge that Lind v. Lynch, 665 P.2d 1276, 1279 (Utah 
1983) can be read to require affirmative evidence negating the subject i ssue . 
This has no effect on the inquiry before the court in t h i s case because 
defendants produced such evidence. (R.322-47). 
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"foreclose the possibility" that a jury "might" find for the 
nonmovant on the element at issue. 
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, in turn, discussed the nonmovant's 
burden on summary judgement. Anderson held that the trial court 
must consider the nonmovant's ultimate burden at trial when ruling 
on a motion for summary judgment. The court made no reference or 
holding with respect to the movant's burden and explained the 
nonmovant's burden as follows: 
[A] court ruling on a motion for summary 
judgment must be guided by the New York Times 
"clear and convincing" evidentiary standard in 
determining whether a genuine issue of malice 
exists -- that is, whether the evidence 
presented is such that a reasonable jury might 
find that actual malice had been shown with 
convincing clarity. 
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby. 477 U.S. at 257. Based upon this 
evaluation, "[r]ule 56(c) mandates the entry of summary judgment 
. . . against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to 
establish the existence of an element essential to that party's 
case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at 
trial." Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322 (emphasis added). 
The Court of Appeals' reliance upon the "foreclose the 
possibility" language likely arose from a misunderstanding of the 
Anderson court's citation to the decision in Adickes v. Kress & 
Co. , 398 U.S. 144 (1970). In Adickes the plaintiff alleged that 
her civil rights were violated by a conspiracy between a store and 
the local police when the police arrested her for vagrancy shortly 
after the store's lunchroom denied her service because she was 
eating with several negro children. Id. at 146-161. Defendant 
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moved for summary judgment by presenting affirmative evidence to 
demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue as to the existence of 
a conspiracy. Id. Defendants failed, however, to present any 
evidence negating the central fact on which plaintiff relied to 
demonstrate a conspiracy i.e., the fact that a policeman was in the 
restaurant when plaintiff was denied service. Id. at 159-61. 
Summary judgment was improper because defendant failed to meet its 
initial burden. C£. Lind v.Lynch. 665 P.2d at 1279. 
The accuracy of this analysis is demonstrated by Anderson 
itself. In that case, the burden was shifted from the movant to 
the nonmovant (thus requiring the court to determine the 
evidentiary burden on the nonmovant) based upon an affidavit from 
the investigative reporter who authored the subject articles. 
Anderson, 477 U.S. at 245. In the affidavit, the reporter averred 
(i) that he wrote the articles from a wide variety of sources, and 
(ii) that at all times he believed and still believed the facts 
contained in the article were true and accurate. Id. at 245-46. 
A list of the sources for each of the allegedly libelous statements 
was attached to the affidavit. Id. Moreover, an introductory 
article was written by the editor (and co-defendant) who relied 
exclusively upon the articles written by the investigative 
reporter. Anderson. 477 U.S. at 244-45. 
The instant case differs from Adiekes and Lind and is similar 
to Anderson because defendants moved for summary judgment by 
presenting affirmative evidence negating Mayor West's claim that 
they published the municipal power statements in the July Column 
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with ac tual malice (R. 322-47). As in Anderson, defendants Hogun 
and Goodey presented a f f idav i t s to the effect tha t they r e l i ed 
so le ly upon Guldan for the accuracy of the statements in the July 
column and tha t they had never had any reason to doubt h is 
accuracy. Id. They a lso submitted Guldan's a f f idav i t l i s t i n g the 
mult iple sources for the al leged statements and h i s be l ie f tha t he 
did not doubt and had no reason to doubt the accuracy or 
t ru thfulness of any of the factual a sse r t ions contained in the July 
column.9 
Having presented t h i s evidence, the burden of proof shi f ted to 
Mayor West to demonstrate a genuine dispute of fact on the issue of 
ac tual malice. Publisher Hogun and Editor Goodey were not required 
to "foreclose the p o s s i b i l i t y " tha t some off- the-wall jury might 
ru le in West's favor.10 Rather, they were only required to "point 
out" to the court the absence of a genuine issue of fac t . The 
t r i a l court was then required to enter judgment against the Mayor 
unless a reasonable jury could find tha t ac tual malice was 
es tabl i shed with c lear and convincing c l a r i t y . Because the Court 
of Appeals improperly concluded otherwise, and because i t 
9
 To the extent Mayor West's l e t t e r to the c i t i zens of LaVerkin may 
have created doubts concerning Mayor West's pre-e lect ion posi t ion on municipal 
power, they gave defendants no cause to doubt the actual asser t ions in the July 
column. See Section 4A, supra. 
10
 Recognition of the proper a l locat ion of the burdens of the movant and 
nonmovant on summary judgment i s especial ly important in the F i r s t Amendment 
context where t h i s Court and other courts have recognized the importance of 
summary judgment in order to preserve v i t a l free speech p r inc ip les . Cox v. 
Hatch, 761 P.2d 556, 561 (Utah 1988) (acknowledging a f i r s t amendment in te res t 
in disposing of l i ab le cases on motion and at an early stage when i t appears that 
a reasonable jury could not find for the p l a i n t i f f s ) ; Hickev v. Capital 
Cities/ABC 792 F. Supp. 1195, 1999 (D. Ore. 1992) (summary judgment i s the 
preferred means of dealing with f i r s t amendment cases due to the ch i l l ing of 
f i r s t amendment r igh ts inherent in expensive and time consuming l i t i g a t i o n ) . 
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improperly concluded that there was sufficient evidence in the 
record for a jury to find that the standard had been met,11 this 
Court must reverse the decision below. 
IV. MAYOR WESTfS EIGHT CATEGORIES OP ACTUAL MALICE 
"EVIDENCE" ARE IRRELEVANT TO THE INQUIRY AS TO 
WHETHER PUBLISHER HOGUN AND EDITOR GOODEY 
PUBLISHED THE MUNICIPAL POWER STATEMENTS IN 
THE JULY COLUMN WITH ACTUAL MALICE. 
To avoid summary judgment, Mayor West was required to 
demonstrate that publisher Hogun and editor Goodey in fact 
entertained serious doubts about the accuracy of the alleged 
implication that Mayor West intended to deceive the voters. He 
asserts that this implication rises out of the following statement 
in the July column: 
I said Mayor West had been opposed to 
municipal power during the election. The 
Mayor claims he never took that position. 
Several LaVerkin citizens however, have told 
me that prior to the election they were under 
the impression West was opposed to municipal 
power, which is why they voted for him. 
Phil Phillips, who serves as Chairman of the 
planning and zoning commission, said West came 
to him after the election and said he was 
changing his position on municipal power and 
would support it. If West never actually came 
out before the election and said he was 
opposed to municipal power, he certainly did a 
masterful job of creating an illusion he was. 
July Column. Mayor West relies upon eight categories of "facts" 
from which he claims a jury could find actual malice by clear and 
convincing evidence. Mayor West's asserted facts are sheer 
gossamer and nothing more than a collection of events and circum-
West, 835 P.2d at 289, n. 11. 
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stances that are (a) irrelevant to the issue of actual malice,12 
(b) have already been rejected by the United States Supreme Court 
as insufficient to establish actual malice,13 or (c) are simply 
false.14 
A. Publisher Hocrunfs Involvement and 
State of Mind. 
Stripping away the improper and irrelevant evidence described 
above, West is left with two "inferences" relied upon by the Court 
12
 As but one example, plaintiff's fourth point of evidence of actual 
malice (entitled "Defendants Motivation as Evidence of Actual Malice") is nothing 
more than an attempt to establish the erroneous proposition that defendants 
"hated" plaintiff and were out to "get him." Appellee's Brief at 34-35. 
Evidence of ill-motive, even if true, which it is not, is simply not probative 
on the issue of actual malice and has been repeatedly rejected by the U.S. 
Supreme Court. See e.g., Harte-Hanks v. Connaucrhton, 491 U.S. 657 (1989); Henry 
v. Collins, 380 U.S. 356, 357 (1965). 
13
 As an example, plaintiff's sixth category of circumstantial evidence 
showing actual malice is defendants' "refusal to apologize, correct or retract." 
Setting aside the fact that defendants did retract the only inaccurate factual 
statement identified by legal counsel, the failure to retract has been repeatedly 
rejected by Courts as insufficient to establish actual malice. E.g., Anderson 
v. Rocky Mtn. News, 15 Med. L. Rptr. [BNA] 2058 (10th Cir. 1988) (per curiam); 
New York Times Co. v. Conner, 365 F.2d 567, 577 (5th Cir. 1966). In New York 
Times v. Sullivan, the Court declared that "[t]he Times' failure to retract upon 
respondent's demand . . . is likewise not adequate evidence of actual malice for 
constitutional purposes." New York Times, 376 U.S. at 286. 
14
 Mayor West argues that defendants attempted to suppress information 
favorable to the plaintiff i.e., the so-called "letters to the citizens." Brief 
of Appellee at 19-21; see also. West, 835 P.2d at 188. This assertion is simply 
false. Defendants published the Mayor's letter to the editor on July 2, 1988 on 
the same page with Guldan's July column (R. 280-81). The Mayor's letter 
specifically referenced his "letters to the citizens": 
I sent a letter to LaVerkin citizens dated October 21, 1987 encouraging 
the citizens to vote for a municipal power. 'Even though there are risks 
of higher power rates in purchasing the system, how do you get ahead in 
this life if you don't take some risks? We do not have a crystal ball to 
forecast the future and it is only our opinions as to what we should do.' 
(Letter dated Oct. 27, 1987) 
Exhibit F, Brief of Appellants, Mayor West's Letter to the Editor (parenthetical 
in original). Therefore, defendants did not suppress the letters or their 
content. Indeed, they freely opened their forum for Mr. West to expound on the 
letters upon which he so heavily relies. Significantly, Mayor West makes no 
assertion that the Spectrum somehow limited or cut the space in which he could 
respond to Mr. Gulden's column. If the "letters to the citizens" deserved more 
prominence, it was West, not Hogun or Goodey, who was responsible for failing to 
give them appropriate attention. 
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of Appeals to demonstrate that Publisher Hogun entertained "serious 
doubts" that the municipal power statements in the July column were 
accurate: 
(a) Hogun failed to investigate further or review the 
second article in an attempt to protect himself from suit; and 
(b) Hogun instructed his managing editor to review the 
second article. West, 835 P.2d at 188. Acceptance of the first 
inference by the Court of Appeals implicitly holds that Hogun had 
serious doubts about the accuracy of an article he did not read. 
This holding is antithical to principles of free speech and freedom 
of the press. There is no constitutional duty requiring a 
publisher to review any article published by his or her newspaper 
to verify the accuracy of the assertions therein. Gertz v. Welch, 
418 U.S. 323, 332 (1974); Liberty Lobby v. Anderson, 19 Med. L. 
Rptr. [BNA] 1016 (1990). Indeed, a publisher is fully entitled 
under the First Amendment to rely on his or her reporters and/or 
editors to perform those functions, which is exactly what publisher 
Hogun did. In fact, he instructed both editor Goodey and attorney 
Anderson to review the July column prior to publication. In 
short, Publisher Hogan could not have entertained serious doubts 
about statements in a column which he never read. Therefore, 
reliance upon this inference was impermissible under the First 
Amendment. 
Even if Publisher Hogun somehow knew the substantive content 
of the July column prior to publication, the only shred of evidence 
West offers that Hogun had serious doubts about the accuracy of the 
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information i s h i s " l e t t e r s to c i t i zens" concerning h is pree lec t ion 
pos i t ion on municipal power. (R. 349+ a t 27) . These l e t t e r s 
simply would not, and did not, c rea te any ser ious doubts concerning 
the issue a t hand. I t i s per fec t ly consis tent for Mr. West to have 
ac tua l ly sent the l e t t e r s out to a l l c i t i z ens of LaVerkin and for 
several LaVerkin c i t i z e n s , as well as Phil P h i l l i p s , to have made 
the contradictory statements they did to Rick Guldan.15 Certainly 
not a l l c i t i z ens would have read the l e t t e r s even if they received 
them. 
In order to r a i s e doubts on these i s sues , Mayor West was 
required to demonstrate tha t (i) Phil Ph i l l i p s never conversed with 
Guldan concerning West's pos i t ion on municipal power or did not 
make the statement which Guldan a t t r i b u t e d to Ph i l l i p s and tha t 
( i i ) Hogun was aware tha t the conversation did not take place as 
reported.1 6 He a lso need prove tha t Hogun had evidence from which 
he could en t e r t a in doubts about whether Guldan had the other 
15
 The f a c t s of t h i s case do not demonstrate a conscious des ire to avoid 
the truth as in Harte-Hanks v. Connaughton, 491 U.S. 657 (1989) where the 
defendant was on not ice that a tape recording of an independent source 
contradicted the reported l i b e l o u s statements but consciously decided not to 
l i s t e n to the tape recording. Rather, the event r e l i e d upon by Mayor West amount 
to mere denials which are i rre levant to the actual malice inquiry. As one court 
s ta ted: 
Surely l i a b i l i t y under the "clear and convincing 
proof" standard of New York Times v. Sul l ivan cannot be 
predicated on mere denia l s , however vehement; such 
denia ls are so commonplace in the world of polemical 
charge and countercharge that , in themselves, they 
hardly a l e r t the conscient ious reporter to the 
l ike l ihood of error. 
Edwards v. National Audobon Society , 556 F.2d 113, 121 (2d Cir. 1977). 
16
 In fac t , P h i l l i p s acknowledged the accuracy of Guldan's statement by 
Aff idavi t (R. 349+, Exhibit 2, Aff idavi t of Phil P h i l l i p s at 3 ) . 
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conversations with the c i t i z ens represented. West presented no 
evidence to t h i s effect and the t r i a l court so held. (R. 360-65). 
The only other evidence upon which the Court of Appeals r e l i e d 
- - tha t Hogun ins t ruc ted h i s managing ed i to r to review the second 
column p r i o r to publ ica t ion -- i s more specious than the a s se r t i on 
tha t p re-publ ica t ion review by legal counsel i s evidence of ac tual 
malice.1 7 There i s absolute ly no legal au thor i ty for the proposi-
t ion tha t request ing pre-publ ica t ion review by an ed i to r of a s tory 
evidences subject ive doubt about the accuracy of the s tory 
reviewed. Moreover, there i s no evidence18 t ha t publ isher Hogun 
requested such legal review because he en ter ta ined ser ious doubts 
about the accuracy of the municipal power statements in the July 
Column. 
B. Editor GoodeY#s Involvement and 
Sta te of Mind. 
Similar ana lys is of the Court of Appeals' decis ion reveals 
tha t the only claimed evidence tha t ed i to r Goodey acted with actual 
malice with respect to the municipal power statements in the July 
column i s the fact tha t he was s imi la r ly aware of the Mayor's 
" l e t t e r s to c i t i z e n s . " West, 835 P.2d a t 188-89. For the reasons 
se t for th above, these l e t t e r s could r a i s e no doubts su f f i c ien t to 
in fer ac tual malice on the par t of Editor Goodey. Goodey was 
17
 While Mayor West disagrees with Appellants' and SPJ's reading of the 
Court of Appeals' dec i s ion with respect to the ev ident iary value of pre-
publ icat ion review by l ega l counsel , he apparently concurs that i t i s not 
evidence of actual mal ice . Brief of Appellee at 41-42. 
18
 This argument n e c e s s a r i l y accepts the Mayor's p o s i t i o n with respect 
to the fac t /op in ion dichotomy and assumes that the proof necessary to demonstrate 
actual malice goes to the municipal power a s ser t ions themselves, not the 
connotations as demonstrated in Sect ion I , supra. 
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confronted with the Mayor's " l e t t e r s to c i t i z e n s , " on the one hand, 
and Guldan's statements based on the views of several LaVerkin 
c i t i z e n s , on the o ther . Faced with these conf l ic t ing viewpoints, 
Goodey published both viewpoints s ide by side in the newspaper --
conduct which should be applauded as f a i r and balanced journalism, 
not the bas i s upon which to deny summary d i spos i t ion of a l i b e l 
claim. There i s simply insuf f ic ien t evidence in the record to 
demonstrate with c lea r and convincing c l a r i t y tha t e i t h e r Publisher 
Hogun or Editor Goodey acted with actual malice in publishing the 
July Column and the Court of Appeals' decision to the contrary must 
be reversed.19 
19
 In summary, the problems in Mayor West's "evidence" are described in 
the following locat ions: Point 1: footnote 14, supra; Point 2: Discussion, 
supra, a t 19; Point 3: Brief of Appellants at 42-44; Point 4: footnote 12, supra; 
Point 6: footnote 13, supra: Point 8: Brief of Appellants footnote 29. 
West's remaining categories of evidence -- the lack of time r e s t r a in t for 
publicat ion and knowledge of harm l ike ly to follow -- are equally i r re levan t . 
The former would apply only if actual malice was an objective standard of care 
based upon the reasonableness of the subject conduct under the circumstances. 
This standard has been c lear ly rejected in favor of the actual malice standard 
adopted in New York Times. St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 730-31 (1968) . 
Evidence of the harm l ike ly to follow from a publication i s s imilar ly 
unavailing. By def ini t ion, a l l l ibe l lous statements expose the subject of the 
statements to public "hatred, contempt or r i d i cu l e . " Utah Code Ann. § 45-2-2(1) 
(1992) thus, a l l l ibe l lous statements by def ini t ion wil l harm the person about 
whom they are made. Finding that knowledge of the l ikelihood of the harm from 
a published statement to const i tu te evidence of actual malice i s tantamount to 
making the media s t r i c t l y l i ab le for l ibe l lous statements. Moreover, the actual 
malice standard i s only designed to deter false defsimatory statements. Accurate 
defamatory statements are encouraged. New York Times, 376 U.S. a t 269-70. 
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V. MAYOR WEST'S CONTINUED RELIANCE UPON NEGATIVE 
CONNOTATIONS FROM DICTIONARIES IS MEANINGLESS 
TO THE ANALYSIS CONCERNING WHETHER THE 
ASSERTION THAT HE "ATTEMPTS TO MANIPULATE THE 
PRESS" IS CAPABLE OF DEFAMATORY MEANING 
Appellants argued in their opening brief that the Court of 
Appeals misapplied the law of defamation and abrogated the trial 
judge's duty to determine in the first instance whether a statement 
is capable of defamatory meaning. Brief of Appellants at 46-50. 
The Court of Appeals held that the assertion that the Mayor 
"attempts to manipulate the press" is capable of defamatory meaning 
because (a) a secondary dictionary definition ascribed a "negative 
connotation" to the word "manipulate," and (b) there is a 
corresponding "possibility of debate" as to whether this would 
subject West to ridicule, hatred and contempt. West, 835 P.2d at 
190. Mayor West sheds no new light on the Court of Appeals' folly. 
Rather, he merely references yet another dictionary definition. 
Brief of Appellee at 45. 
The Court of Appeals' and Mayor West's search for and 
continued reliance upon negative connotations from, dictionaries 
adds nothing to the analysis of whether a statement is capable of 
defamatory meaning. Several definitions are given to almost every 
word in any dictionary. Mere negative connotations abound. The 
dictionary relied on by the Court below ascribed four definitions 
to the word "manipulate": (i) "to control, manage or play upon by 
artful, unfair or insidious means especially to one's own 
advantage," (ii) "to treat, work, or operate with the hands or by 
mechanical means: handle or manage esp. with skill and dexterity," 
22 
( i i i ) "to t r e a t or manage with the mind or i n t e l l e c t , " and (iv) "to 
control the ac t ion or course of management: u t i l i z i n g by-
cont ro l l ing or managing." West. 835 P.2d a t 190, 192; Webster's 
Third New In te rna t iona l Dictionary (unabridged) 1376 (1986).20 The 
fact tha t words often have mult iple meanings i s exactly why t h i s 
Court, and o thers , requires a statement to be considered in i t s 
context to determine whether i t i s capable of defamatory meaning. 
Cox v. Hatch, 761 P.2d 556, 561 (Utah 1988). 
The Court of Appeals apparently recognized the need to place 
the subject statement in context . The Court argued tha t i t was 
inherent in the accusation tha t West attempts to manipulate the 
press tha t West sought to "control the information disseminated to 
the pub l i c . " Id. a t 190. The Court found tha t the mere 
"pos s ib i l i t y of debate" tha t t h i s could subject West to hatred, 
r i d i c u l e and contempt rendered the statement capable of defamatory 
meaning. Proper ana lys i s , however, d i c t a t e s tha t the a s se r t ion did 
not expose West to public hatred, r i d i cu l e or contempt. The court 
in Gross v. New York Times Co., 587 N.Y.S.2d 293 (N.Y. App. Div. 
1992) analyzed a s imi la r claim. In Gross, the subject a r t i c l e 
al leged tha t New York C i ty ' s chief Medical Examiner a l t e r ed (or 
20
 Indeed, statements much more l i k e l y to subject a person to r i d i c u l e 
and contempt (by reference to the dict ionary de f in i t ions ) have been held non-
defamatory. For example, the term "blackmail" was held to be non-defamatory in 
i t s context in Greenbelt Cooperative Publishing Ass'n v. Bres ler , 398 U.S. 6 
(1970) , yet one d e f i n i t i o n of that term i s "extortion by threats esp. of public 
exposure or criminal prosecution." Webster Ninth New Col leg ia te Dictionary 
(1991) . S imi lar ly , the term "traitor" was held to be non-defamatory based upon 
the context in which i t was used in Letter Carriers v. Austin, 418 U.S. 264, 284-
86 (1974) even though that term i s defined as "to hand over, de l i ver , betray, 
. . . (1) one who betrays another's trus t or i s f a l s e to an ob l igat ion or duty 
(2) one who commits treason." Websters at 1251. 
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directed subordinates to alter) entries regarding the cause and 
manner of death of several individuals while they were in police 
custody. .Id. at 299. The Court held that the allegations were not 
capable of defamatory meaning. Id. The court noted that, while 
the alleged alterations may constitute a violation of law, they 
might also simply reflect the exercise of the Chief Medical 
Examiner's prerogative to substitute his own interpretation of the 
medical evidence for the conclusions reached by a member of his 
staff. Id. at 299. Similarly, allegations that autopsy results 
were misstated or did not accurately reflect the condition of the 
subject bodies might suggest that evidence was ignored or tampered 
with, but might also reflect inadvertence, mistake, incompetence, 
or poor note taking. Id. The court concluded: 
[T]hat a given statement might be interpreted 
as an allegation of wrongdoing is not 
sufficient to render it actionable. Courts 
will not strain to interpret a statement as 
either libelous [sic] or non-defamatory. 
Id. Certainly in Gross the subject public official was accused of 
precisely what the Court of Appeals speculated was possible for 
debate in the instant case, i.e., a desire to control information 
disseminated to the public. West, 835 P.2d at 190. This was, 
however insufficient to make the statement defamatory. Gross, 587 
N.Y.S.2d at 299. 
Moreover, as correctly noted by Judge Garff in his dissent, 
the accusation that a political candidate would attempt to exercise 
influence over the press is "a mainstream, public expectation . . . 
not at odds with the fundamental social order," citing Cox v. 
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Hatch. 761 P.2d at 562 and thus, "is not defamatory," 835 P.2d at 
192. 
Approaching the task of interpreting the debatable meaning of 
the alleged libel in light of the imperatives of "uninhibited, 
robust and wide open" debate which accepts "vehement and caustic" 
criticism of public officials leads to the inescapable conclusion 
that the subject statement is not capable of defamatory meaning 
under Utah law. New York Times Co. . 367 U.S. at 271; Cox v. Hatch. 
761 P.2d at 561. Therefore, the Court of Appeals' holding that the 
contrary should be reversed. 
CONCLUSION 
Mayor West offers no meaningful arguments based upon precedent 
or reasoned analysis to support the majority opinion below. 
Rather, the mayor chooses to rely almost exclusively upon that 
Court's analysis, as if to say "the Court of Appeals so held and 
therefore this Court should also." Because the errors in the 
majority opinion's holdings have been thoroughly demonstrated, that 
decision should be vacated in total. 
DATED this 1st day of March, 1993. 
RANDY L./DRYER 7 j 
DAVII} f. ZIMMERMAN ^ 
PARSONS-BEHLE & LATIMER 
Attorneys for Appellants 
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Donald Hogun 1. No actual malice 
(Affirmed) 
1. No actual malice 
(Reversed) 
1. Not defamatory 
(Reversed) 
Brent Coodev 1. No actual malice 
(Affirmed) 
1. No actual malice 
(Reversed) 
1. Not defamatory 
(Reversed) 
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